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BLURRED LINES: IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS IN SOUTH AFRICAN YOUTH POLITICS 
ANNE HEFFERNAN
*
 
ABSTRACT 
Ideological affiliations like Africanism, charterism, and Black Consciousness shaped the political 
boundaries of student and youth political groups in South Africa during the tumultuous 1980s. 
These delineations have also been used in the secondary literature to understand organizational 
competition and when considering how young activists negotiated contested political ground. 
However, this article suggests that the boundaries between opposing organizations were often 
blurred by their overlapping use of competing ideologies; it further argues that these divisions, 
although articulated ideologically, were rooted in organizational affiliation and competition for 
political influence and territory. It analyses the ideological development of the Congress of South 
African Students, the Azanian Students’ Organization, and the South African Youth Congress, and 
tracks the changing scope for ideological expression within charterist student and youth 
formations. It suggests that during the 1980s the scope for differing ideological expression 
narrowed, and links this process to the ANC’s efforts to establish hegemony within the charterist 
movement. The article finally extends this analysis to the ANC Youth League’s use of ideology 
after apartheid, and considers how ideological difference within youth politics is beginning to be 
expressed outside the fold of charterism.  
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS have reinforced the realization that, 
more than twenty years after the attainment of majority rule, race remains an unresolved 
question in the ‘Rainbow Nation’. From the failure of programmes like Black Economic 
Empowerment to achieve widespread economic opportunity among previously oppressed 
racial groups
1
 to recent movements to #Transform South Africa’s universities2, it is 
increasingly evident that the official platform of nonracialism propagated by the African 
National Congress has failed to adequately address the country’s long history of race-
based discrimination. Authors like Bond
3
 and Marais
4
 have argued that this is a 
consequence of the ANC’s neoliberalism, and failure to address South Africa’s class 
stratification. I suggest that the enduring significance of race in post-apartheid South 
Africa also has roots in the marginalization of divergent ideologies that resulted from the 
ANC’s efforts to establish its hegemony in South African politics. This project was 
undertaken by the movement in exile beginning in the late 1970s, and was effectively 
completed by the time of the democratic transition in 1994. However, the resurgence of 
race as a critical issue in South Africa’s political discourse, and particularly the reprisal 
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of Black Consciousness ideas among student movements, suggests a failure to adequately 
engage some of these issues in contemporary South Africa and, arguably, a failure of 
nonracialism itself.  
  This paper argues that one key way in which the ANC achieved hegemony was by 
absorbing opposing ideologies, particularly aspects of Black Consciousness and 
Africanism, into the fold of its nonracialism, which is based around the ideas of the 
Freedom Charter. To demonstrate this I identify key moments in the student movements 
of the 1980s when the boundaries between the competing ideologies of charterism, Black 
Consciousness, and Africanism were alternately blurred and sharpened, and seek to 
unpack the divisions between these ideologies. I argue that, although often taken as 
clearly delineated, these boundaries were porous. Though the ideas themselves were not 
clearly divided, conflict between organizations resulted in the use of those ideas to draw 
firm organizational boundaries. Understanding the content and uses of these ideologies in 
student politics during the 1980s is important for understanding their legacies in the post-
apartheid dispensation. To support my argument, I analyse the ideologies of the Congress 
of South African Students, the Azanian Students’ Organization, and the South African 
Youth Congress, and the ways that these have evolved and influenced ideology in youth 
politics after apartheid, particularly within the ANC Youth League.  
  Charterism, Africanism, and Black Consciousness were key points of self-identification 
for organizations in the 1980s, which took these traditions as their ideological parentage. 
They have also provided academics and observers with convenient ways to group the 
numerous organizations that emerged during this period. Some authors, like Seekings, 
have interrogated the ideological scope of affiliates of the UDF, and Charles Carter’s 
study of the Alexandra Youth Congress explores that organization’s relationship to the 
Freedom Charter.
5
 Despite these exceptions, it remains common for authors discussing 
the student movements of the 1980s to group organizations under their self-appointed 
banners of ‘charterist’, ‘Black Consciousness’, and ‘Africanist’, without fully exploring 
their ideological differences.
6
 In this article I contend that by the time of their adoption by 
student groups in the 1980s these divisions were based on differences of political 
affiliation rather than ideology, and that, for a period, student organizations allowed 
scope for a wide range of ideological expression within these frameworks.  
  My argument is supported by evidence from a range of sources – it draws on archival 
material produced by and about COSAS, AZASO, and SAYCO: press releases, private 
correspondence, public speeches, and official documents like constitutions and 
manifestoes illuminate not only the public platforms of these organizations, but also 
internal ideological debates. Oral sources – interviews that I and others have conducted – 
help contextualize these debates. The paper further brings together a survey of the 
literature on student politics in the 1980s and uses the case-specific analyses of a range of 
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authors to draw out a new argument about the wider role of ideas in student politics in 
South Africa. 
  This article is situated in the literature on social movements – and student politics, in 
particular – in South Africa. It develops some of the ideas of ideological flexibility within 
the UDF that Jeremy Seekings has identified in organizations like the Release Mandela 
Campaign, and extends them to an analysis of key student and youth groups.
7
 It builds 
upon Gerhart’s thesis of the use of ideology as a ‘weapon’ by bringing her analysis to 
bear on the 1980s.
8
 Following Marks
9
, I interpret the violence perpetrated by and 
between students and youth as a purposeful tool, but I further cast these internecine 
conflicts as an example of the politics of enmity – ideologically articulated, but 
organizationally delineated. My argument extends the existing literature by using these 
perspectives to analyse the role of ideology in youth politics in South Africa after 
apartheid. It considers the ways in which the ANC has established and maintained 
political hegemony and the extent to which the ANC Youth League has participated in 
that project. It also considers recent ideological fractures within youth and student 
politics that have diverged from this hegemony, locating these divisions in relation first to 
the flexible use of ideology and later the hardening of ideological spaces during the 
student movements of the 1980s.  
 
 
Ideological roots and branches 
 
The key division within South African liberation politics during the 1980s was ostensibly 
ideological, between ‘charterist’ adherents to the Freedom Charter (and supporters of the 
banned ANC) and the inheritors of Black Consciousness, the philosophy of African self-
reliance that emerged from black universities in the 1970s. Black Consciousness 
overlapped and was compatible in some fundamental ways with the older idea of 
Africanism.  Since its articulation by a generation of youth leaders in the 1940s, the 
racially exclusive focus of Africanism had challenged the pluralist alliances that were 
growing in South African opposition politics. A generation later, Black Consciousness 
used similar rhetoric and rationale to distance black students from white activists in order 
to create a discursive space where black activists could conceive and pursue a path to 
liberation.  
  The Freedom Charter was launched at the Congress of the People in 1955. It was a 
cooperative effort of the ANC, the South African Communist Party, the South African 
Indian Congress, and other organizations in the congress movement. Though the Charter 
covers a gamut of issues, from educational access to land ownership, its core principle is 
racial equality. In an overt challenge to the racial segregation of apartheid, it begins with 
the phrase ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white.’  This principle – 
alternately described as multiracial and nonracial – came to be the defining characteristic 
that united groups under the banner of charterism, and one that distinguished them from 
Africanists.    
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  The years following the drafting of the Charter led to conflict within the ANC over the 
principle of multiracialism and the role of other racial groups (particularly white liberals 
and communists) in the anti-apartheid struggle. In 1959 these tensions reached a breaking 
point, and an Africanist faction within the ANC split from the party and formed the Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC). This moment, which has been widely analysed
10
, marked the  
division between the multiracial ideals of charterist groups and the racially exclusive 
ideals of Africanist ones. It set the stage for this divide to be replicated in the production 
of future liberation organizations, which are the subject of this paper.  
  A decade after the PAC split from the ANC both organizations were in exile, and a new 
ideology developed on black, Indian, and coloured university campuses during the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Black Consciousness was influenced by ideas from the 
contemporary Black Power movement in America and critics of colonialism like Frantz 
Fanon, as well as the ideas of Africanists in South Africa. Founder Steve Biko and other 
prominent BC activists drew on some of the ideals of Africanism by dismissing nonracial 
charterism and by championing black self-reliance, and psychological as well as physical 
liberation. They favoured a broadly inclusive definition of ‘black’ that included the other 
targets of apartheid oppression: Indians and coloureds. This measure of racial inclusivity 
was one of the significant divergences of BC from its Africanist predecessors. While 
Africanists had advocated African-only self-reliance, when Black Consciousness 
advocates declared ‘Black man, you are on your own!’11 they spoke to all members of 
South Africa’s oppressed racial groups. In many ways Black Consciousness opened a 
distinctly new ideological space in South African liberation circles, but in its critiques of 
liberalism and multiracialism, and by advocating the exclusion of even sympathetic 
whites from the struggle, ideologically it shared some important tenets with Africanism.
12
  
  Around the same time that Black Consciousness was emerging on university campuses, 
the ANC began to shift from describing itself as ‘multiracial’ to ‘nonracial’. Functionally 
this meant that interracial cooperation could take place within the organization, rather 
than only between sympathetic, single-race groups. Accordingly, in 1969, the ANC 
allowed non-Africans to become members (though only in exile; inside South Africa  
multiracialism was still employed).
13
 Notably, Black Consciousness activists also 
envisioned a ‘nonracial’ future for South Africa, but this was perceived as a goal that was 
only attainable after fundamental change throughout South African society: blacks 
needed space to psychologically overcome centuries of oppression, and whites needed to 
forsake all of their social, political, and economic privileges to be truly nonracial.
14
 If 
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nonracialism was the destination, it could not also be the road to get there. Following this 
conflicted past, what nonracialism means in South Africa today is still unclear. Based on 
data gathered from focus groups in 2011, David Everatt declared, ‘Non-racialism […] is 
among the founding principles of the democratic South Africa’s constitution, but has no 
real meaning.’ As I will argue, such ideological blurring was characteristic of student 
organizations in the 1980s, and, as Everatt suggests, it has real implications in political 
discourse today.   
 
 
The ascendancy of charterism and the Congress of South African Students 
 
After a long period of dormancy, charterism’s re-emergence in student politics developed 
during the 1976 Soweto uprising, a critical turning point in South African youth politics. 
Ideologically, though it was loosely organized by a Black Consciousness affiliate, the 
uprising allowed adherents of BC to mobilize alongside charterists under the banner of an 
educationally-specific issue: protesting the imposition of Afrikaans in township 
classrooms.
15
 It was the first time charterism had publically re-emerged in student politics 
since the banning of the ANC in 1960.  
  Three years later, the Congress of South African Students (or COSAS) capitalized upon 
those beginnings. COSAS built upon the permissive ideological space the uprising had 
created. It was the first ‘congress’ organization for students in South Africa since the 
banning of the ANC in 1960,
16
 and it was the first to officially adopt nonracialism and to 
support the Freedom Charter, preceding the formation of the United Democratic Front 
(UDF) - of which it would become an affiliate - by four years.  
  The delegates at COSAS’ founding conference, Matona has argued, represented diverse 
political ideologies: charterists in the mold of the ANC were prominently represented, but 
there were also Black Consciousness delegates, members of the newly formed Azanian 
People’s Organization (AZAPO), and other groups. This led to some debate over the new 
organization’s ideological platform. ‘On the question of a name, ANC sympathizers 
insisted that it should include the word “congress”, while BC supporters proposed the 
Venda name “Khuvhangano” (Union) or alternatively, a name including “Azania”.’17 The 
latter would clearly have aligned the new organization with AZAPO, which had inherited 
the mantle of Black Consciousness and adhered to a racially separatist philosophy. In the 
end, the charterists won the naming debate, and the Congress of South African Students 
was born.  Early COSAS leaders signaled the ideological importance of this decision: 
Ephraim Mogale, COSAS’ first president, said it ‘was the first organization in South 
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Africa to put the masses back into the congress tradition, and by so doing [it was] joining 
the past with the present and guiding the people to nonracial democracy’.18 
  In spite of the naming debate, and Mogale’s declaration in favour of nonracialism, 
initially COSAS provided space for both ideologies; it was open to all students in South 
Africa, regardless of political affiliation.
19
 This was facilitated by its early focus on 
educational concerns (particularly access, fees, and student-teacher relations), rather than 
broader political issues.
20
 As COSAS described itself in a 1984 pamphlet: 
 
[COSAS] saw the need to organize and educate students about their day to day problems in their 
schools such as corporeal punishment, lack of text books, unqualified teachers, poor exam results, 
unmarked scripts, etc. They saw the need to unite all students throughout the country, Africans, Indians 
and Coloureds.
21
 
 
This racially inclusive language marked COSAS’ emerging charterism, though it is worth 
noting that the groups they sought to unite - Africans, coloureds and Indians - were the 
same demographics Black Consciousness included under the banner of ‘black’. COSAS 
did not attempt to cross the starkest colour line and include white students, who they 
perceived as difficult – if not impossible – to mobilize at the time:  
 
The problem [of mobilization] only arised [sic] as far as white students were concerned; for black 
students there was no problem. […] The white high schools of the time were by and large the terrain of 
the System and [the schools worked] to pit them against the black people, to mobilize them for the 
assault on black people. […] But we had to leave it open – perhaps in future, the situation could 
change.
22
   
 
The interracial cooperation and inclusivity that were among COSAS’ core principles, 
then, were perceived as possibilities for the future rather than ones to be pursued in the 
present. It is also important to note that, in spite of its rhetoric of multiracial organization, 
COSAS’ units at the branch level – secondary schools – were, thanks to Bantu Education, 
racially singular in composition. No single branch was able to transcend apartheid’s 
rigorous controls on race within schools, further demonstrating the gulf between the 
articulation of nonracialism and COSAS’ ability to practice it.   
  By the 1980s what had earlier been the hesitant reemergence of charterism as an 
ideology among students gathered steam. Badat
23
 and Seekings
24
 have both suggested 
that the increased visibility of charterist organizations during the early 1980s influenced 
the renewed interest of students in charterism and multiracial ideology; they point to 
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increased activity by the ANC’s armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe, to the launch of the 
Release Mandela Committee that same year, which raised the profile of Nelson Mandela 
and other ANC political prisoners who had been in prison for nearly two decades, and to 
a publicity campaign around the Freedom Charter itself (the Sunday Post printed a copy 
alongside an article on the history of the document).
25
  With the founding and growth of 
COSAS, and increasing visibility and adoption of the Freedom Charter, 1980 was the 
year that charterism - if not necessarily the banned movements that championed it - came 
out from underground.   
  Even from its early days COSAS was moving towards being an explicitly charterist 
organization – the first of its kind in nearly two decades – but a minority of members still 
identified with Black Consciousness. Whitey Mohapi, an early leader, recalled a group of 
students within COSAS who ‘call[ed] itself Azanian and wanted to use COSAS for Black 
Consciousness motives’.26 Another student activist spoke of an entire COSAS branch in 
Kimberley that was ‘quite problematic’ because it was ‘Black Consciousness inclined’.27  
And in the most visible way the make-up of COSAS’s organization mirrored nothing so 
much as BC’s inclusive definition of ‘black’. Though students of the early 1980s were 
increasingly identifying with the Freedom Charter, what that meant in an ideological 
sense had yet to be settled. It was a question that was to be contested in COSAS and other 
organizations over the rest of the decade. 
 
 
The suspension of Nkondo and AZASO’s turn to charterism 
 
A year after COSAS was founded, the Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) 
launched its own student wing. Branches of the Azanian Students’ Organization 
(AZASO) were established at the five historically black universities and one training 
college; in later years, they expanded among technical and educational colleges, and to 
black students at the ‘open’ English-speaking universities (like the Universities of the 
Witwatersrand and Cape Town).  
  At its inception, AZASO espoused the Black Consciousness ideology of AZAPO and its 
BCM forerunners. It saw itself as the inheritor of the South African Students’ 
Organization’s mantle among black university students.28  Many of its early members had 
been politicized through BC ideology and in the wake of the Soweto uprisings. The link 
to Black Consciousness was to be short-lived, however. From its very early days there 
were arguments within AZASO about its political philosophy. These were exacerbated by 
internal dissent over the suspension in early January 1980 of Curtis Nkondo as AZAPO’s 
President. Nkondo was a prominent figure in Soweto education circles; he had been a 
principal and chairman of the Soweto Teachers’ Action Committee, which supported 
student activists in the wake of June 1976. When he came to head AZAPO, he was 
particularly popular with their student supporters. In the role for only a few short months, 
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Nkondo was suspended for ‘violating [AZAPO] principle and policy and not respecting 
protocol.’29 His suspension was met with angry condemnation by student groups, like 
COSAS and AZASO itself.
30
  
  The violation of protocol of which Nkondo was accused was never publically stated by 
AZAPO, but it was considered an open secret that he had been suspended because his 
politics were too sympathetic to the ANC. As Joe Phaahla, an AZASO leader, stated in an 
interview with a student publication, ‘[S]ome of the people who were in AZAPO thought 
that why Mr Nkondo really had to go was because it was said that he was a 
“charterist”.’31 After his suspension, Nkondo publically acknowledged this affiliation:  
 
Adhering to the Freedom Charter is the only way in which we can mobilise the masses. Any deviation 
from this is, in my humble opinion, a complete betrayal of the struggle for liberation.
32  
 
Divisions between Africanists and charterists were hardening in the early 1980s, and 
Nkondo’s expulsion represented the end of the scope that had existed in the wake of the 
Soweto uprising and in COSAS’ early days for student organizations to straddle the two 
camps.   
  Following AZAPO’s suspension of President Nkondo, AZASO re-examined its own 
political philosophy. In December 1980, the interim committee of AZASO called a 
summit conference to discuss the issue at which ‘the deficentcy [sic] of black 
consciousness philosophy as a rallying point was highlighted by various delegates.’33 
Among these deficiencies delegates noted that the appeal of Black Consciousness had 
been confined to black intellectuals.
34
 The issue was hotly debated at the conference, and 
one delegate even threatened to walk out in protest at the adoption of a new charterist 
preamble to the AZASO Constitution.
35
 However, the majority of student delegates 
present disagreed: they found that Black Consciousness was too narrow a framework for 
AZASO and ‘that for the organization to play a meaningful role in the liberation struggle, 
a more broader [sic] but clearer approach to defining issues at stake should be adopted.’ 
This dissension from its ideological roots caused the AZASO delegates to redraft the 
preamble of their constitution and to sever ties with AZAPO and its Black Consciousness 
ideology. It was more than two years before AZAPO formed a new student body to carry 
its torch, and by the time their Azanian Students Movement (AZASM) was born it lagged 
behind AZASO in organization and support on the campuses that had once been BC 
strongholds.
36
 This organizational failure exacerbated the increasing divide of the 
Africanist inheritors of Black Consciousness from their original student base. 
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  By the mid-1980s, AZASO and AZASM embodied the often violent conflict between 
supporters of charterist and Africanist ideology. In late April 1985, AZASM held a 
meeting at The University of the North (Turfloop) to discuss its upcoming national 
convention. The meeting was interrupted when ‘a group of students shouting support for 
the Freedom Charter marched into the hall’ carrying an assortment of weapons and ‘a 
fracas broke out’.37  During this confrontation, several members of AZASM and AZAPO, 
including the latter’s former president (and former Turfloop student and Black 
Consciousness activist) Lybon Mabasa, were assaulted and later hospitalized.  As Mabasa 
described the incident:  
 
They said I had been confusing a lot of people with the Black Consciousness philosophy and socialism.  
They beat me up with hammers and stones.  I received a knife wound in the arm when I tried to block 
the attack.  They told me to chant ‘Mandela’.  I refused and they beat me up until I lost consciousness.38 
 
The attackers, who were ‘shouting support for the Freedom Charter’ and sought to make 
Mabasa chant support for imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela, were members of 
AZASM’s on-campus rival, AZASO. This incident illustrates the degree to which 
divisions between charterist and Black Consciousness student groups had become 
violently polarized; far from the permissive space in earlier bodies like COSAS, there 
was heated conflict between AZASO and AZASM for influence and control on 
campuses. It also indicates the lack of ideological difference behind these conflicts; the 
AZASO students chanted support for the Freedom Charter, but displayed – with their 
dismissal of “confusing” socialism – little understanding or regard for some of its 
principles. In fact, the Freedom Charter had advocated economic redistribution long 
before groups like AZASM and AZAPO adopted the principle.
39
   
  Such conflicts between members of the two groups were increasingly frequent, and even 
dissuaded some students from joining either group for fear of the violence. Jimmy 
Mohale, a Turfloop student in 1985 and 1986, recalled in an interview with Isak Niehaus: 
 
There were many political organizations at the university and I sympathized with all of them.  All of the 
student organizations fought for liberation, so I could not understand why they were fighting each other. 
[…] The big rivals were AZASO and AZASM.  There was no tolerance.  At one stage all the AZASM 
students had to leave our residence because their lives were being threatened […] I did not understand 
this in-fighting.  That is why I never wore a T-shirt of any organization.
40
  
 
Mohale’s description of the conflicts on campus as ‘in-fighting’ is revealing.  As he 
points out, both organizations were fighting for liberation and, as this paper has argued, 
ideologically they overlapped: both groups supported forms of economic redistribution, 
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and even where nonracialism was espoused, COSAS and AZASO students did little to 
enact it, meaning that the membership of these groups and of AZASM looked very 
similar. Nonetheless, as the examples above indicate, such similarities did not lessen the 
violent confrontations between supporters of charterist organizations, like AZASO and 
the UDF, and supporters of Black Consciousness ones, like AZAPO.  
  This polarized opposition – epitomized by these violent clashes – can be more 
productively understood as a politics of enmity than through the prism of ideological 
difference. As I have argued thus far, ideologically both charterist and Africanist groups 
overlapped in policy and practice, yet the lines between them were starkly drawn and 
violently maintained. German political philosopher Carl Schmitt identified the distinction 
between friend and enemy as the core feature of all politics
41
, and recently his theory has 
been reprised and applied in African contexts. James Brennan has read the development 
of the socialist state in independent Tanzania in this context, and, in South Africa, Daniel 
Magaziner has applied it to conflict within the Black Consciousness Movement.
42
 
Expanding on Magaziner, I argue that the division in student politics that is cast broadly 
as charterists versus Africanists/Black Consciousness is also essentially a politics of 
enmity – of who belongs and who does not – and, as Brennan argued, that this sometimes 
resulted in ‘purge categories’ as one side sought to eliminate the other. Monique Marks’ 
work on student and youth violence in Diepkloof, Soweto during the 1980s and 1990s 
supports this interpretation: ‘People or property symbolizing the apartheid state, as well 
as individuals who threatened the cohesiveness of the township or the hegemony of the 
Charterist movement, were targeted and attacked, verbally abused, beaten, and sometimes 
killed.’43 As is clear from the description of violent clashes between AZASO and 
AZASM, these tactics were not restricted to township youth, but were replicated in 
student groups around the country.     
  In late 1986, AZASO leaders took the decision to change their organization’s name to 
the South African National Students’ Congress (SANSCO) to consolidate its charterism 
and relationship to affiliates (like COSAS) by including congress in its name, and to 
jettison the last nominal tie to its Black Consciousness roots: the use of ‘Azania’ rather 
than ‘South Africa’. As we have seen in the debates at the formation of COSAS, naming 
was the first and most public declaration of a group’s political affiliations. In the case of 
AZASO, the renaming to SANSCO sought to do just that, but it did not signify any 
changes in policy, which had already been consolidated after its break with AZAPO. 
AZASO had been firmly charterist since 1980; now its name finally reflected that 
affiliation. 
 
 
The South African Youth Congress and the re-emergence of Africanism 
 
Outside AZASO’s and COSAS’s scope, political organization among younger students 
and non-student youth existed primarily within local youth congresses. These 
                                                 
41
 Carl Schmitt, The concept of the political (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008), p. 26.  
42
 James Brennan, ‘Blood enemies: Exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political thought of 
Tanzania, 1958-75’, Journal of African History, 47 (2006), pp. 389-413; Magaziner, The law and the 
prophets, p. 140. 
43
 Marks, Young warriors, p. 129.  
11 
 
organizations existed around the country – in urban townships and rural villages – and cut 
across a swathe of black South African society. Nominally, at least, they were charterist, 
having emerged in the early 1980s during charterism’s renaissance.44 But Charles 
Carter’s interviews with activists in the Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO) reveal that 
though ‘identifying with the Freedom Charter […] enhanced organizational activity’, 
activists’ attachment to the Charter was not necessarily ideological. As one activist 
explained, 
 
AYCO never had a problem of a line [of ideology], because COSAS never had a problem of a line. We 
just took the Freedom Charter, which had been in circulation since 1980. We just became non-racial 
from the start. We didn’t have a problem with this, because we felt if there were problems, then the 
national movement would deal with the problems.
45
 
 
This was an organizational triumph for the ANC in exile, which made a concerted effort 
to mobilize activists within South Africa around the Charter, particularly in reference to 
its thirtieth anniversary in 1985.
46
 Their success is evident in its adoption by groups like 
AYCO, but it is equally evident that the Charter was embraced more as a symbol than for 
its ideological content. As Shireen Hassim has written about women’s movements of the 
1980s, among youth groups adoption of the Charter became shorthand for affiliation with 
the banned ANC.
47
 
  AYCO was one of hundreds of similar youth congresses across South Africa in the mid-
1980s. When the matter of uniting these groups arose, the new South African Youth 
Congress (SAYCO), rather than its student-run counterparts, took the lead. The first steps 
toward founding a national youth organization were taken in mid-1986, when youth 
leaders Peter Mokaba and Deacon Mathe traveled to meet with ANC leadership in exile 
to discuss plans for the new youth body.
48
 In Harare, Zimbabwe they discussed direction 
and political content of the new organization with ANC leadership, thereby linking 
SAYCO more closely to the ANC than any youth organization inside South Africa had 
been since the ANC Youth League became defunct in 1960. Though the ANC had 
maintained a National Youth Secretariat at its headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, this body 
primarily coordinated youth affairs for the party in exile and was not closely involved in 
youth politics inside the country.  
  The ANC’s support may have been motivated by the need to keep South Africa’s youth 
under control, as well as by the desire to unite groups under the Freedom Charter and to 
extend its political hegemony.  An ANC document produced by the National 
Consultative Conference in 1985 discussed the need to manage the political zeal of 
youth:  
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The youth is as enthusiastic in its search for knowledge as it is militant in the fight for the realization of 
the ideals it holds dear. […] Due to their inexperience and illusions bred of their psychological make-
up, young people can be easily swayed into positions that are counter to their interests.
49
 
 
Similarly, Hugh Macmillan has noted that the ANC in exile had long wanted to harness 
the political potential of youth inside South Africa, particularly after the Soweto uprising. 
A 1979 presidential report worried that ‘we will fritter away the considerable talent of our 
youth and lose it to reactionary politics and wasting life styles’.50 These concerns were 
part of the larger hegemonic project that occupied the ANC throughout the 1980s. Their 
support for building a national structure to organize youth under a charterist banner 
demonstrates that this was still a priority when they participated in the planning for 
SAYCO, a decade after 1976.  
  SAYCO was finally launched in March 1987.  It was the product of the broad network 
of local and regional youth congresses across South Africa and operated primarily as a 
coordinating body for these groups that had emerged during the early and mid 1980s. It 
adopted the ideals of the Freedom Charter, aligned itself with the ANC (even seeking the 
approval of the party in exile), and worked to unite the disparate, localized congresses 
that had come to characterize youth politics across the country. In this SAYCO differed 
from the student and youth movements that had preceded it: it gathered together a vast 
constituency that had already organized itself into units. Estimates of SAYCO’s size vary 
widely (from approximately 200,000 up to two million), due to the lack of consistent 
record-keeping and membership requirements among its affiliates, but even the smallest 
estimates suggest it was demographically significant, and larger than its predecessors.
 51
 
Uniting this vast base around a common ideology and exerting organizational cohesion 
was a primary challenge for SAYCO’s new executive committee.   
  The ANC’s influence on SAYCO is evident from their consultation in its founding, and 
also in its constitution, which advocates adherence to the Freedom Charter and 
nonracialism. In the preamble, SAYCO’s founders declared themselves dedicated to the 
creation of ‘a free, unitary, non-racial and democratic South African culture’.52 Yet 
alongside this professed charterism, SAYCO sometimes seemed to straddle an array of 
ideas. It exhibited a strong Leninist-Marxist strand (contrasting its fellow charterist 
organization, AZASO, which had been so critical of socialism), and while professing to 
support nonracialism, its populist president Peter Mokaba often invoked African identity 
politics to rouse his base.  
  Mokaba’s populism and Africanism sat uncomfortably with UDF leaders, who made an 
(unsuccessful) attempt to marginalize him in the late 1980s.
 53
 In turn, African leaders 
inside the UDF, including Mokaba, responded forcefully to what they saw as a ‘cabal’ 
within the UDF. Race was explicitly at issue: the prominence of Indian leaders like 
Treasurer Azhar Cachalia and General Secretary Valli Moosa in the UDF reinforced the 
idea that African leaders were being marginalized within the Front. The controversy 
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around the cabal issue reflects a breakdown of nonracialism in practice and rhetoric 
within some of the UDF’s structures, as well as the complicated internal politics of the 
UDF. These encompassed a wide breadth of ideologies among its activists and 
organizations, from socialist to capitalist to Africanist. Increasingly, SAYCO was 
straddling these; though it paid lip service to nonracialism, it was deeply enmeshed in the 
racial politics of the UDF. 
  Glaser has noted that SAYCO ‘was an organization that relied on charismatic leadership 
and a spontaneous following’ due to the difficulty it faced in maintaining regular 
structures during the repressive late 1980s.
54
 Consequently, it mobilized large groups 
around particular issues but was less able to exert organizational cohesion through its 
ranks. This was not necessarily a political disadvantage; it allowed Mokaba and other 
leaders to use Africanist rhetoric that sometimes challenged nonracialism, but that rallied 
their substantial youth base. In one speech Mokaba deftly deployed a class-centric 
Marxist-Leninist critique of apartheid, modified with a particularly Africanist slant, 
saying, ‘No genuine revolutionary, no honest man or woman can deny that the African 
people in South Africa are locked in the Bantustans, single sex hostels, and compounds 
[…] not because they are workers, but because they are black and African.’55 Mokaba’s 
use of Africanist rhetoric marks its reintegration into the mainstream of youth politics, 
which had been sidelined since the split between AZAPO and AZASO in 1980. As I have 
argued, that split ended the permissive space for co-existence of Africanist, Black 
Consciousness, and charterist ideologies in student organization that existed during the 
late 1970s. When SAYCO leaders began to adopt some Africanist ideas, however, they 
did so without acknowledging their origins; for the first time since the PAC had split 
from the ANC, Africanism was being employed under the banner of charterism, rather 
than in competition with it. This marked an important step in the movement toward 
absorbing, and thus co-opting, competing ideologies into the scope of nonracial 
charterism. 
  Mokaba’s ability to use rhetoric that did not adhere strictly to the letter of nonracialism 
was one facet of SAYCO’s prized autonomy. Following Shireen Hassim’s use of 
Molyneux to explore the issue of autonomy within women’s movements of the 1980s, I 
characterize the autonomy that SAYCO achieved from 1987-1990 as ‘associational 
autonomy’.56 SAYCO existed in alliance with the United Democratic Front, but it 
retained its ability to make decisions of policy and practice independently from the UDF. 
In fact, a great deal of SAYCO’s constitution is devoted to its autonomy, stressing that 
‘The central administration of SAYCO rests in its own decision making structures alone 
[…].’57, even while affirming SAYCO’s connection to other ‘fraternal organizations’ 
with which it shared membership, including the UDF: ‘Those members who take an 
active part in fraternal organizations […] are obliged to carry out decisions without 
endangering the independence of SAYCO’.58 The tension between SAYCO’s autonomy 
and its place amongst a wide array of movements pushing for democratic change in South 
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Africa shaped the movement. It allowed the use of rhetoric that challenged its explicitly 
nonracial ideology, but it also straddled a constant dilemma between independence and 
belonging.   
  This problem was recognized and addressed by the SAYCO executive after unbanning 
in 1990, when they decided to move ‘from a federal structure to a unitary structure’. The 
result of this move was a significant loss of the autonomy that SAYCO branches had 
maintained from 1987-1990. As an article in its newsletter The Young Lion announced,  
 
This means all SAYCO affiliates are to lose their autonomy. The system of democratic centralism will 
come [in] the place of a federal system. All youth congresses will now be SAYCO branches. They will 
all work on the basis of the SAYCO policy and constitution.
59
 
 
It also meant that what scope there had been for articulating ideological difference inside 
SAYCO, born of its loose structures and of leadership that rhetorically straddled 
ideologies, narrowed considerably. The Young Lion went on to state that SAYCO’s now 
‘common understanding of the national democratic struggle’ was reflected in ‘the 
adoption of the Freedom Charter, the adoption of the colours green, black, and gold, and 
the recognition of the ANC’s leadership in the liberation struggle’.60 This turn, after 
unbanning, marks the ANC’s successful consolidation of their leadership over one of the 
country’s largest organized constituencies, and also, in the rhetoric of youth leaders like 
Mokaba, their co-option of the Africanist ideas that had begun to find space under the 
banner of Charterism. How these ideas were developed, changed, and eventually 
marginalized in the democratic era is explored in the next section.   
 
 
The ANC Youth League and youth politics after apartheid 
 
SAYCO’s abandonment of its federal structure and embrace of the unbanned ANC 
presaged a major development in nonracial youth politics in the early 1990s: the re-
launch of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). The League, which had been defunct since 
banning in 1960, became the organization that would lead South Africa’s charterist youth 
into the post-apartheid era. After unbanning there was a scramble amongst organizations 
for primacy in the effort to re-launch it. Among internal activists, the push was led by 
SAYCO. In Mokaba’s presidential address at the SAYCO Conference in April 1990 (at 
which Nelson and Winnie Mandela represented the ANC) he called for reconstituting the 
moribund ANCYL, and was keen that SAYCO should be at the forefront of this 
initiative: ‘The ability of Sayco to exist and grow in conditions of concentrated enemy 
fire is the history and experience that the new organization the ANC Youth League 
cannot do without.’61 This statement implicitly takes aim at SAYCO’s main competition 
in the formation of the new ANCYL: the National Youth Secretariat (NYS), having spent 
the struggle in exile, had not endured ‘the concentrated enemy fire’ Mokaba described. 
Thanks in large part to his efforts, the ANCYL that emerged from the negotiations 
resembled SAYCO far more than the NYS. The (now no longer federal) structures of 
SAYCO became the unitary structure of the ANCYL, and the membership of SAYCO 
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branches became members of the ANC Youth League. As one activist noted of his local 
youth congress, the Sekhukhune Youth Organization (SEYO), ‘what actually [was] 
SEYO became branches of the Youth League and the ANC.’62  
  Even under these new, more rigid ideological conditions, Mokaba was a firebrand who 
acquired a reputation for inflammatory rhetoric during the negotiations between the 
ANC, the National Party, and other political stakeholders in the final years of apartheid.  
Much of his rhetoric during this transition was highly racialized, belying the nonracial, 
‘rainbow nation’ narrative that ANC leadership like Nelson Mandela presented.  Mokaba 
became known for singing the inflammatory song, ‘Dubul’iBhunu’ or ‘Shoot the boer’. 
His heated words to a loyal and impressionable youth base had the power to ignite further 
violence during the volatile early 1990s, a period when the politics of enmity – and 
purging – was at its height in South Africa.63 They also defied the ANC’s own rhetoric of 
nonracialism.  
  To an extent, the ANC allowed this dissention. Anthony Butler has noted that the post-
apartheid ANC is characterized by ‘a complex system of alliances that allow diverse 
class, ideological, gender, and generational differences to be expressed and yet at the 
same time remain incorporated into a wider project.’64 But in order to remain 
incorporated there are limits on such expression. When competing ideas within the fold 
blatantly subvert official dogma like nonracialism they are brought into line or are 
excluded from the ‘broad church’ of the ANC. This process has characterized the party’s 
relationship to its Youth League over its years in governance and during the transition of 
the early 1990s. Peter Mokaba’s singing of ‘Dubul’iBhunu’ challenged the ANC’s 
rhetoric of cooperation during the delicate period of negotiations, and he was censured 
for it by the party in May 1993.
65
 Nearly twenty years later, another Youth League 
president, Julius Malema, was similarly rebuked for singing the same song.
66
 Raphaël 
Botiveau has suggested that the unruliness of the Youth League was politically expedient 
for the ANC itself during negotiations; it cast the main party as a moderate alternative to 
a fractious and possibly dangerous youth wing at a time when many South Africans 
feared a violent insurrection.
67
 I would further suggest that the ability of the ANC to 
publically exert control over the League, as it has done with Mokaba and other youth 
leaders, solidifies this position.  It enables it to consolidate its political hegemony by 
bringing its allies into tighter control, which also broadens its appeal to potential 
supporters.  
  This double-edged effect of the ANCYL’s insubordination may explain some of the 
leeway that the ANC has given it. Mokaba’s rhetoric and the League’s public criticisms 
of the negotiations process demonstrate that, even after SAYCO abandoned its federal 
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structure, youth in the charterist movement still retained some public autonomy and used 
it to dissent from the main party.
68
 I suggest, though, that this autonomy was mostly 
nominal – the ANCYL could voice dissent, but not act on it – and, following Botiveau, 
that occasional public displays of rebelliousness benefitted the main party as well as the 
Youth League. It differed substantively from the ability of earlier youth organizations to 
determine their own policies and practices, like the associational autonomy that SAYCO 
had under the UDF. 
  Deborah Posel has pointed to this kind of public autonomy in the ANCYL as a key 
factor in opening ‘a space of ideological and political unruliness […] within the ANC.’69 
I argue that the ANCYL’s ideological ‘unruliness’ can be traced even earlier, to the 
student and youth groups that played influential roles in its founding.  Perhaps rather than 
‘unruly’ this is better understood as a fluid capacity for adopting and adapting aspects of 
different ideologies as its own, at least in a rhetorical sense. They often instrumentalized 
the expression of ideas for political ends (as SAYCO used Africanism to negotiate the 
racial politics within the UDF). The ANCYL inherited this practice from SAYCO, which 
in turn had adopted both COSAS and AZASO’s capacity to straddle ideologies. As Posel 
suggests, this fluid ideology is something that has endured in the post-apartheid era. But 
as my discussion of the new form that the ANCYL’s autonomy took suggests, the ways 
in which the ANCYL uses different ideologies are much more constrained by its 
relationship to its parent body than any of its predecessors in the 1980s.  
  By the middle of the 1990s, the Youth League’s rhetorical use of ideology was shifting. 
Clive Glaser has indicated that during negotiations the ANCYL began to ‘drift 
rightwards’, leaving the revolutionary Marxism of SAYCO behind.70 This, at least in 
part, was due to alliances formed with both Thabo Mbeki and Winnie Mandela, who were 
both ANC Africanists, with little affinity for Marxism.
71
 Mokaba himself became a 
business owner, and he, and later his successor Malusi Gigaba, supported Thabo Mbeki’s 
platform of ‘African Renaissance’ and a general trend to the political right in the ANC 
itself.
72
  (Mbeki’s biographer, Mark Gevisser, has described the 1998 introduction of 
African Renaissance as something that ‘could have been lifted straight out of the SASO 
Policy Manifesto’ of 1971, and as a marker of Mbeki’s adherence to Black 
Consciousness.
73
) But in this period ideology took a back seat to what Glaser has called 
the League’s ‘bureaucratic centralism’ under Gigaba, and its deference to the guidance of 
the ANC.
74
 Ironically, given the moment of Mbeki’s African Renaissance, this shift away 
from deeper ideological engagement in youth politics left the questions about race that 
Black Consciousness had privileged in its philosophy unresolved. 
  Notably, this happened in tandem with a growing politics of accumulation in the Youth 
League; by 2005 William Gumede described the League as ‘the playground of yuppie 
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politicians who drive smart cars and live the high life’.75 For the first time in generations, 
being a young black activist in South Africa afforded opportunities within the state, rather 
than a lifetime of struggle against it. During the 1990s and 2000s members of the 
ANCYL executive leveraged their positions as points of entry into business and national 
politics. Tom Lodge has pointed to the ANCYL and its politics of conspicuous 
consumption as a key factor in the growth of neo-patrimonialism and decline in 
ideological adherence in the ANC itself.
76
  
  After more than a decade of loyalty, in 2005 under the leadership of Fikile Mbalula the 
ANCYL began to vocally oppose Mbeki and shifted its support to Jacob Zuma.  This 
seemed an astonishing ‘somersault’77 to observers, particularly as the ANCYL forged 
alliances on the political left (notably with the communist party and unions), which it had 
previously reviled. (The Youth League had not advocated leftist policies of redistribution 
since the early 1990s.) In December 2007 at the ANC Conference in Polokwane, this 
alliance succeeded in ousting Mbeki from power. Zuma was elected president of the 
party, and less than a year later Mbeki was effectively deposed as the head of state. Only 
a few years later, the League once again abandoned the party president – now Zuma – in 
favour of a new candidate, and a new ideological platform of ‘economic freedom for 
all’.78 
  A great deal has been written about these events
79
, but they are particularly revealing 
when considered in light of the ANCYL’s use of ideology: after years of autonomy in-
name-only, the League asserted an ideological difference from the ANC. Did this 
represent a re-engagement with ideas in youth politics, after the relative neglect of 
ideology since the mid-1990s? I would argue that something more pragmatic, and 
reminiscent of the late 1980s, was at work. Like SAYCO before it, the Youth League of 
the late 2000s was comfortable mixing aspects of different ideologies to suit its political 
purposes.  In terms of demographics, racialized language, and tendencies to use African 
identity as a cohesive tool, it exhibited strains of Africanism, and was enmeshed in a 
process of capitalist accumulation; but in the face of shifting factional politics within the 
ANC, the League was able to turn volte-face and adopt a rhetoric of economic 
redistribution and nationalization in 2011 that countered their earlier position. In spite of 
this rhetoric of redistribution, the politics of accumulation endured inside the ANCYL, 
supporting the contention that alliances and factions matter more than political ideology 
in the organization.   
  Julius Malema, president of the ANCYL from 2008 until his expulsion in 2012, was 
partly responsible for the ideological shift to the left; in spite of accusations of hypocrisy 
in light of the accumulative politics of the League (which many thought Malema 
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embodied), the new platform found traction among many South Africans. This new 
ideological turn – and renewed rebelliousness – in the Youth League presented an 
unacceptable challenge to the ANC’s hegemony and Jacob Zuma’s position as president, 
though. After being expelled from the ANC, Malema launched a new political party, the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) based on the principles of redistribution and 
nationalization that he had adopted in 2011. This marked a new engagement outside the 
ANC-Charterist fold with some of the (economic) ideals that had been sidelined by the 
compromises of democracy, like the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
programme of 1996.
80
  
  Notably, these principles remained popular within the ANC Youth League after 
Malema’s expulsion. An executive member of the ANCYL provincial structure in 
Limpopo said that even after the formation of the EFF, he and others would continue to 
champion the cause of economic freedom within the ANCYL, in spite of the failure of 
the ANC itself to support this platform. When asked why he didn’t defect to the EFF 
since he supported its policies, he explained, ‘No, we must bring about change from the 
inside.’81  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The ideological porosity described to me by the Youth League activist in Limpopo – in 
which the same ideas are present in two opposing organizations – is reminiscent of the 
student and youth structures of the 1980s, and I argue it has its roots there. That capacity 
for ideological fluidity in the ANCYL today is inherited from SAYCO and its 
predecessors. It comes from a tradition of ideas that were sometimes overshadowed by 
political expediencies and shaped by the politics of enmity and alliances in the many 
student and youth organizations that participated in South Africa’s struggle for liberation.  
  That fluid ideological space is also increasingly constrained by the hegemony of its 
parent party.  After its expulsion of Malema and his executive in 2011, the ANC 
dismantled the structures of the ANCYL in all of South Africa’s provinces over several 
months in 2012-13. These were replaced by Task Teams, which were appointed by the 
ANC Secretary General and responsible for ‘rebuilding’ the League, a process that lasted 
more than a year and stripped the ANCYL of much of its weight in internal party 
politics.
82
 By dismantling the Youth League in the wake of Malema’s disciplinary 
infractions and ideological dissent from the party, the ANC signaled clearly that the 
remaining space for expressing aspects of opposing ideologies within its ranks was 
closing.  
  This was a process that had begun decades before; the scope for deeply interrogating 
differing ideologies like charterism and Africanism, and for them to truly coexist in one 
organization, fundamentally narrowed in the mid-1980s. In contrast to the relatively 
permissive space for diverse ideological engagement that had existed in COSAS during 
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its early years, the fraught conflict between AZASO and AZASM hardened the 
ideological lines between charterist and Black Consciousness student organizations. By 
the time SAYCO reprised some Africanist language, drawing out a number of racial 
tensions in its relationship to the UDF, it had lost Black Consciousness’ broader 
understanding of ‘black’ as well as its desire to create a new discursive space within the 
liberation struggle. Under SAYCO, and under the ANC Youth League as well, this 
ideological language came to be used to articulate discontent with a ‘parent’ body – as in 
the case of the UDF ‘cabal’, and concerns over the ANC’s negotiations and later 
leadership, rather than a new (or old) ideological turn.   
  These hardening lines did not necessarily represent a deeper investment in the tenets of 
charterism, Black Consciousness, or Africanism, though. Young activists used these 
ideologies in fluid and flexible ways to straddle allegiances (with groups like the ANC 
and UDF), to extend their reach (as with COSAS’ tacit allowance of Black 
Consciousness branches), to defend organizational turf (in AZASO and AZASM’s battle 
for dominance on campuses), and to appeal to particular constituencies (as Peter 
Mokaba’s populist Africanism did). This instrumentalization of ideological categories 
began in the 1980s, and has remained a feature of youth politics in South Africa today.  
